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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
PAUL HILL, by and through
his guardian ad li tern,
JAMES L. HILL,
Plaintiff-Appellant
vs.
REX CLOWARD and RUBIN
McDOUGAL, d/b/a
The Frostop,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No. 9687

RESPONDEN'T'S BRIEF
STATEMEN'T OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to recover damages for personal injury arising out of an auto accident.
DISPOSITION IN THE DOWER COURT
The jury answered questions to a special verdict on the basis of which the court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. A motion for new
trial was made and denied.
RELIEF SOU'GHT ON APPEAL
Plain tiff seeks a new trial.
STATEMENT OF F A:CTS
The accident occurred on the morning of Auggust 8, 1961, on Kearns Boulevard (5415 South)
1
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between 4220 West and 4320 West, (R. 25, 85).
The plaintiff, Paul Hill, was 11 years of age on
July 13, 1961, (R. 53). The defendant, Rex Cloward,
at the time and place of the accident was driving
a 1958 International one-half ton truck, ( R. 14).
The truck had running boards on either side which
were concealed and completely covered by the cab
doors when the same were closed. Back of the cab
and in front of the bed on the left side of the truck
there was a little platform or running board about
a foot long. There was a refrigerated box in the
back of the bed of the truck in which ice cream
products were carried. This box was right up against
the cab of the truck. One side of the box was tight
against the side of the truck and on the other side
there was about six inches between the box and
the side of the truck. There was thirty six inches
between the back of the box and the tail gate, ( R.
79, 80, 81). The truck had a music m~achine and
played different tunes. It was used for the sale
of ice cream products, (R. 17, 20, 21). It was admitted by the answer that Rex Cloward at the time
and place of the accident was ~acting as an agent
an'd employee of the defendant, Rubin McDougal,
(R. 4).
The plaintiff's home was located at 4309 West
5500 South in Kearns, ( R. :54). The defendant,
Cloward, was proceeding west in the truck on 5500
2
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South selling ice cream when the plaintiff and another boy, Bruce Davenport, came out and asked
for some free ice cream. Cloward stopped in front
of the Hill home, ( R. 73, 74). He saw Bruce Davenport get on the little platform back of the cab on
the left side of the truck, but according to him the
plaintiff went to the back of the truck, (R. 74, 82).
He did not at any time see the plaintiff on the
platform, ( R. 75). Davenport got off the truck
before Cloward started up, (R. 82). At that time
according to Cloward the Hill boy was in the area
back of the truck and out of his vision, (R. 82).
He was definitely not on the little platform or running board, ( R. 83). Cloward proceeded slowly west
and according to him when he got to a dip in the
road at 4360 West, he heard the plaintiff say he
wanted to get off. This was the first time he knew
that the plaintiff was on the truck, (R. 83). He
slowed down to 5 or 10 miles per hour. He could
still not see the plaintiff, ( R. 83), but to lid him he
would let him off at the stop sign at the Kearns
Boulevard, ( R. 84). He then made a right turn on
4420 West and proceeded north to the stop sign
at Kearns Boulevard which according to plaintiff's
Exhibit P-2 is a distance of approximately a block,
(R. 84). He came to a complete stop and at that
time did not see the plain tiff on the truck and assumed that he got _off, (R. 84). l-Ie turned right
1
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and started off fairly slow as he made a right turn
to proceed east on Kearns Boulevard, ( R. 85). From
that time on he did not hear the plaintiff say anything until he heard a yell and observed someone
lying on the road behind the truck. He did not know
it was the plaintiff but thought someone was trying
to play a prank on him and continued on, (R. 8586). At this time he was traveling between 20-25
miles per hour, (R. 78). He did not know that the
boy was on any part of the truck after he left the
stop sign and had no intent to scare or frighten
him, (R. 87).
Cloward informed the investigating officer,
Pearce, that he thought the plaintiff had got off
at the stop sign, ( R. 31). The plain tiff admitted
that he knew it wasn't safe to ride where he claimed
to be riding on the little pliatform on the left side
of the truck, (R. 61). He had attended safety lectures in ~hool before the accident and his parents
had taught him it was dangerous to ride on vehicles, (R. 62). The plaintiff further admitted that
the truck came to a full and complete stop on 4420
West at the stop sign at Kearns Boulevard and he
"had plenty of time to get off," (R. 63). He admitted the only reason he didn't get off was because
he thought the defendant, Cloward, was going to
take him back home, ( R. 63). Yet he never asked
the defendant, Cloward, to take him home, and the
4
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defendant, Cloward, never told him that he would
do so, ( R. 64). The plaintiff also admitted that
he did not in fact know whether he '''jumped, fell
or slipped" from the truck, (R. 67). The investigating offficer, Pearce, testified that the plaintiff told
him that he didn't know whether "he slipped, fell
or baled off the truck," ( R. 31) and the plaintiff
admitted telling the officer this, ( R. 67). 'The investigating officer testified that the plaintiff got
up from the street and ran to his home, ( R. 2·6).
The plain tiff sustained some bruises and abrasions and a fractured left clavicle, ( R. 38, 39). The
Clavicle was treated by a Figure 8 splint which
is shown on the plaintiff's exhibits P-1 and P-4,
(R. 39). !The splint remained on for five weeks, (R.
42). The doctor saw the plaintiff a total of five
tin1es, ( R. 43) . His total doctor bill including Xrays was $82.50, (R. 44). The doctor admitted
that the bruises and abrasions cleared up without
incident and that the plaintiff was discharged from
his treatment on September 1'2, (R. 45, 46); that
the plaintiff had no functional disability and could
use his arm and shoulder to the full extent 'as before and was free from pain, ( R. 46, 4 7, 51). The
doctor also testified "he could use his arm quite
well in two weeks even with the splint on." (R. 48).
The plaintiff started school which was either in
the last week of August or the first of September
and continued school regularly thereafter, (R. 68).
5
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The ~action was originally brought in the minor's
name only through his guardian ad li tern, James L.
Hill. However, during the course of the trial the
court took the position that the minor could not
recover the amount of the doctor bill; that this was
properly the father's claim. It was then stipulated
by both counsel that the father be made a party to
the action, and if the plaintiff won a judgment,
that judgment in addition would be entered in favor
of the father for the· amount of the special damages, to-wit: $82.50, and that in the event the minor
lost the case the father would be bound by the
judgment, (R. 93).
ARGU'MEN·T
POINT I.
DE'FENDANT'S REMARKS CONCERNING INSURANCE DID NOT INDICATE LACK OF INSURANCE AND IN NO EVENT CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR.

At the outset, it should be borne in mind that
the witness, Rubin McDougal, was the first witness
called by the plaintiff. The jury had just been selected, opening statements had been made, and at
11:16 A.M. Mr. McDougal was called as an adverse
witness, '(R. 13). The statment of which the plaintiff complains occurred within about the first five
minutes of Mr. M·cDougal's testimony. The plaintiff's attorney did not move for ~a mistrial or seek
to correct any alleged error or do any thing what6
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soever, but proceeded directly on with the case. His
second witness, Richard B. Pearce, was called, and
his testimony was completed by 11:53 A.M., (R.
36).
The plaintiff complains that the defendant McDougal's testimony indicated that he had no insurance on the vehicle at the time of the accident. The
defendant's testimony in this regard was: : "I have
no insurance on it at the present time." It was our
opinion that the defendant, by such testimony, had
clearly indicated to the jury that he did have insurance on his vehicle at the time of the accident,
but since he did not have insurance on it at the time
of the trial, he would not assume the responsibility
of driving the vehicle. 'This was also the in terpretation placed upon the testimony by the trial judge
in 1·uling upon the pl aintiff's motion for a new
trial. The trial court took the position that the testimony could not have prejudiced the plaintiff but
in fact prejudiced the defendant as indicating that
the vehicle \Vas covered with insurance at the time
of the accident. We submit that this is the only reasonable interpretation that can be made of the testimony. Viewed in such light, it certainly could not
haYe been prejudicial to the plaintiff. In fact, the
plaintiff must not have considered the testimony
as prejudicial because he made no attempt to examine the defendant to clarify the matter, nor did
1
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he ask the court for a mistrial or for any cautionary instruction. His argument at this time is an
after-thought and should have no merit.
The plaintiff contends that it is common knowledge in the State of Utah that in the event of a
motor vehicle 'accident if the owner is not insured, he
has to post a bond or his license plates are taken
away frmn him. In this connection, he argues that
since the defendant testified he did not· have any
license plates on the vehicle, the only interpretation
which could be derived from the statement was that
his car was not insured at the time of the accident
and his license plates had been taken away from
him. 'The most obvious answer to this line of reasoning is that the plaintiff at the time of the trial could
have questioned the defendant concerning the reason
for his failure to have any license plates on the
vehicle. Such testimony, if pursued, would have
clearly indicated that the vehicle did have license plates on it; that the defendant placed the
vehicle on a used car lot for sale; that subsequently
the vehicle was removed to his brother's place and
used on his brother's premises and that the defendant did not know whether the vehicle actuany
was licensed at the time or not. He knew he had
no't licensed it for 1962. The vehicle, in fact when
produced for the inspection of the jury did have
1961 license plates on it. 'The defendant was under
8
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a mistaken apprehension when he thought the vehicle was not licensed at the time of the trial. The
plaintiff should not complain of something which
he could readily have cleared up by his own exainination had he felt that there was any merit to the
argument which he is now pursuing. The defendant
was the cautious type of individual which his testimony indicated because even though he did not have
any insurance on the truck at the time of the trial,
during the noon recess he called his insurance broker
and arranged for a rider to be placed upon the vehicle to cover it with insurance so that he would
not have to drive it to court without having it insured. He had merely permitted his insurance to
lapse after the accident because he was not using
the vehicle and either had it on a used car lot for
sale or ~n his brother's premises.
Assuming for the purpose of argument that
the statement made by the witness indicated a lack
of insurance on the vehicle at the time of the accident, nonetheless, the law is well recognized that
a party litigant may waive or be deemed to have
waived his right to complain by failing to make
appropriate objection or take proper motion at the
time to seek to have the defect cured. This would
seem to be particularly true in a case of this nature
where the alleged error occurred in the opening
n1inutes of the trial, where if the plaintiff felt he
9
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was entitled to a mistrial, he could have made a
1notion and the jury could have been discharged and
the case started over right then without any delay
or the plaintiff could have pursued the matter by
question and ~answer to develop what he now wants
the court to erroneously assume regarding the lack
of license plates and lack of insurance on the vehicle at the time of the trial.
In the case of Grahm v. Wriston, (W. V.) 120
S. E. (2d) 713, cited by appellant, counsel for defendant in his closing rargument strongly implied
that the defendant was not insured at the time of
the accident when he knew that he was. This is different from our case in that the defendant's counsel voluntarily made the statement in his closing
argument and used it to his advantage and at a
time when there was little that the plaintiff could
do to correct the error. In our ·case there was no
statement that the defendant did not have any insurance at the time of the accident and any statement concerning insurance was made at the very
outset when it could have 'been easily cured or corrected or plaintiff could have moved for a mistrial
and no del'ay would have been encountered.
See 39 Am. Jur. Section 14, page 39, where
it is stated:

"* * * It is also a well-recognized and frequently applied principle that a party liti10
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gant will be deemed to have waived, or will
be considered as being estopped to rely upon,
matters constituting grounds of new trial
which come to his attention or knowledge
during the course of trial, or of which he
should, by the exercise of reasonable diligence,
have acquired knowledge, where he fails to
make objection at the time and seek to have
the defects cured. In other words, one is not
entitled to a new tri al when it appears that
he had knowledge of the irregularity of which
he com pains and did not promptly seek to
have the defect corrected at the trial of the
case, or that his failure to obtain such knowledge and have defect corrected, was due to his
own fault or lack of diligence. Thus, a party
who is aware of any fact or circumstance
affecting the qualification or competency of a
juror, but fails to make objection when the
juror is sworn, or who, by reason of his own
lack of diligence, fails to discover the juror's
want of competency or qualification, cannot
assert the existence of that fact as a ground
for a new trial. It is equally well settled that a
party litigant who acquires knowledge of misconduct on the part of a juror during the
course of trial or of misconduct of his opponent, his counsel, or the court, directly affecting
a juror, and fails to make objection thereto and
seek a remedy at the time, or by lack of diligence fails to acquire knowledge of such misconduct in time to m~ake objection before verdict, is deemed to waive his right to assert
that as a ground for a new trial. * * *"
See also 39 Am. Jur. Section 95, page 110:
uThe defeated party may waive his right
to a new trial on account of misconduct affecting the jury if, after knowledge thereof, he
1

1

11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

goes on with the trial without objection. The
general rule is that misconduct on the part
of anyone in connection with the jury after
their retirement, although it is of a character
which might vitiate the verdict if brought to
the attention of the court by timely complaint,
is not available, after the return of the verdict, as a ground for a new trial or reversal,
where it was known to the defendant or bis
counsel before the return of the verdict."
Furthermore, the defendant's testimony as indicated by the appellant in his brief was not elicited
by either counsel but was brought out in response
to questions made by the court. By weight of authority an irresponsive or inadvertent answer to a
question which calls for proper answer is not ground
for declaring a mistrial. See 4 A.L.'R. ('2d) p. 784.
See Brazeale v. Piedmont Mfg. Co., (S.C.) 192
S.E. 39, wherein the court said:
"* * * Where improper reference is made to
insurance, or an insurance agent, by the witness as was here done, and for which the
plaintiff is not responsible, it seems that the
only remedy that the court can give is to
grant a motion to strike out the objectionable
testimony and to instruct the jury to disregard it."
1

1

Certainly, in our case it is admitted that the
defendant's counsel had nothing to do with the
bringing out of the information to which objection
is now being made. See also 21 Appleman Insurance
Law & Practice, Section 12834 page 806:
1
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"It is not every casual or inadYertent
reference to an insurance company in the
course of trial that will necessitate a mistrial.
Whether the disclosure is such as to constitute error depends essentially upon the facts
and circumstances peculiar to the case under
consideration. And whether the jury should be
discharged following such a disclosure depends generally upon whether there was good
or bad fiaith in the injection of the question
of insurance.
"A mistrial is generally granted only
where the plain tiff's counsel or witness has
deliberately or wilfully undertaken to inform
the jury of insurance, such as where there is
an avowed purpose 'and successful attempt,
and not where the information comes in incidentally in attempting to prove other facts or
where the particular answer was not sought
or anticipated. The rule of prejudicial error
has no 'application where the evidence is introduced by the complaining party. The rule
also does not apply where the information is
innocently volunteered by a witness, or is interjected by an unresponsive answer to a
proper question."
See also Burton v. Zions Cooperative M ercantile Institution, 12'2 Utah 360, '249 Pac. '514. In that
case certain remarks were made before the jury
panel by a prospective juror on voir dire examination to the effect that in his experience insurance
companies were very fair and made settlement wherever due, and that if such companies denied settlement, he felt they would have some ground for such
13
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refusal. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court held
that that remark did not warrant reversal of order
denying plaintiff's motion for mistrial. Justice
Crockett in writing the majority opinion said:
"Once the trial court has exercised his
discretion and made his judgment thereon,
the prerogative of this court on review is
much more limited. If the trial court could
reasonably decide that the jury would not be
prejudiced and that the parties could have a
flair trial, his ruling must stand. In other
words, unless his determination appears to
be so unreasonable that upon review it appears that he was plainly wrong, in that there
is a strong likelihood that the plaintiff could
not have had a fair trial, we cannot say that
his failure to grant one was an abuse of discretion. The rna tter rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and the judgment thereon should be reversed only where there has
been a plain abuse thereof.
"'The foundation of this rule is the same
as in numerous other areas of the law wherein appellate courts give deference to rulings
of the trial court because his judgment must
rest in large part upon his observance of the
conduct, personalities and circumstances with
which he has close con tact. He s'ees and hears
the participants; the manner in which they
act and speak; sees their expressions, hears
the inflections of the voice and has the opportunity to observe their reactions much better
than can be demonstrated to an appellate tribunal from a cold record of the events."
In this case the lower court had occasion to
14
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observe the manner in \vhich the testimony was
given, the effect, if any, which it had upon the
jury, and in his opinion the testimony was not prejudicial to the plaintiff but in fact was prejudicial
to the defendant as indicating that the defendant
carried insurance at the time of the accident.
As indicated by Justice Crockett in the Utah
case, aforementioned, the burden was on the plaintiff to show affirmatively that there was an error
and that it was prejudicial. '~There is a presumption
that the judgment of the trial court was correct,
and every reasonable intendment must be indulged
in favor of it; the burden of affirmatively showing
error is on the party complaining thereof."
If we are going to indulge in assumptions,
which is what the plaintiff has done in his brief,
then the jury could well have assumed that there
was insurance on the vehicle in view of the Utah
Financial Responsibility Law which most people
construe as absolutely requiring vehicles to be insured.
In summary, it is our position that the statement made by the defendant indicated that he had
insurance on the vehicle at the time of the accident
but not at the time of the trial. If there was any
error, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to call it
to the court's attention, attempt to have it corrected,
15
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or move for a mistrial, none of which he did. He
should not be permi ted to go through the case and
then when the judgment did not meet with his approval attempt to have it set aside.
POINT II.
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 14-A WAS NOT
PREJUDICIAL AND WAS NOT GIVEN IN SUCH A
MANNER AS TO BE DETRfMENTAL TO THE 'PLAINTIFF.

It is true that after the case had been concluded
and arguments made by counsel to the jury, that
the trial court indicated that he was going to give
one more instruction which was designated 14-A
and which reads as follows:
"No. 14-A. No person shall ride, and no person driving a motor vehicle shall knowingly
permit any person to ride, upon any portion
of any vehicle not designed or in tended for
the use of passengers. In this case it is undisputed that the plaintiff was riding on the
vehicle at a place neither designed nor intended for the use of passengers. If, therefore,
you find from a... preponderance of the evidence that the. plaintiff, considering his age,
in telligenae and experience, knew or in the
exercise of due care should have known that
it was dangerous to ride or attempt to ride
on the vehicle in the manner in which he was
attempting to do, then and in that event you
are instructed that the plaintiff was negligent." (R. 90, 91)

1

It is the plaintiff's contention that the giving
of this instruction after the argument to the jury
16
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

deprived plaintiff's counsel of the right to review
the instruction with the trial court 1and other counsel, gave special emphasis to the instruction and
amounted to a directed verdict. The plain tiff does
not contend that the instruction was erroneous or
that it did not properly state the law. Therefore,
he could not have been prejudiced in not having an
opportunity to review the instruction with the tri al
court and other counsel.
The plain tiff was not taken by surprise. The
instruction as given was the defendant's requested
instruction No. 12. The pre-trial order which plaintiff had incorporated in the record on appeal refers
to the issues as set forth in the pre-trial statements
which the plaintiff did not have made a part of the
record. In the defendants' pre-trial statement, copy
of which had been served on the plaintiff's attorney
prior to the time of the pre-trial hearing, the defendants set forth the following items of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff minor:
1

"(a) Negligently and unlawfully and without permission riding on some portion
of the defendants' vehicle;
(b) Negligently failing to get off said vehicle after it stopped prior to the accident at which time the plaintiff minor
had ample opportunity to remove himself from said vehicle ;
(c) Negligently riding in a dangerous place
on said vehicle and without permission;
17
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(d) Negligently failing to take any proper
precautions for his own safety." (Italics ours)
The plain tiff was cross examined on the subject and admitted he was riding on a dangerous
place.
In arguing the case to the jury defense counsel
argued that the minor was guilty of negligence in
riding on the platform or running board or any
other portion of the vehicle not designed for passengers, and the plaintiff's attorney had full opportunity to answer the same.
The plaintiff's attorney did not see fit to include with the record on appeal all of the instructions as in fact given by the court. The burden, of
course, is upon him to show error in giving of the
instruction, and he cannot make inferences from instructio~which he failed to include in the record
on appeal. As a rna tter of fact, the insructions as
originally given by the court outlined the plaintiff's
theory in two of the plaintiff's requested instructions but wholly failed to cover in its instructions
the contributing negligence in riding on a dangerous
place on the vehicle which had been one of the defendant's requests. It was for this reason that the
court gave the additional instruction No. 14-A when
he realized that the matter had not been covered in
his instructions as given. In fact, the court would
18
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have committed error had it failed to give the instruction No. 14-A. Utah Code Annotated 1953,
Section 41-6-108, provides as follows:
"No person shall ride, and no person
driving a motor vehicle shall knowingly permit any person to ride, upon any portion of
any vehicle not designed or intended for the
use of passengers. * * *''
This is the matter to which the Instruction No. 14-A
was directed. The plaintiff has not complained nor
shown that this instruction was covered by other
instructions and does not ·complain tba;t the instruction as given fails to state the law.
While generally speaking instructions are all
given at once, it is not uncommon to have instructions given at the close of arguments or out of order
for some reason when either called to the 1attention
of the court or when the court itself has discovered
the necessity of giving the same.
See 88 C.J.S., [Trial, Section 377, page 961,
which reads as follows:
·
''A judge may modify or correct instructions at his own motion, and recall the jury
for such purpose, or to amplify his charge,
or to give additional instructions on mra:terial
issues not covered by the original charge, provided the additional instruction or amplification states the law and the facts correctly
and covers a point not covered in the previous
instructions. * * *"
The court's other instructions specifically in1
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formed the jury that if in the various instructions
any rule, direction, or idea was stated in varying
ways, no emphasis thereon was intended and none
should be inferred; that the jury was not to single
out any certain sentence or any individual p_oint
or instruction 'and ignore the others, but was to consider all the instructions as a whole and was to regard each in the light of all the others. The jury
was further instructed that the order in which the
instructions was given had no significance as to
their relative importance.
The pl1aintiff in his argument claims that after
the plaintiff moimted the platform or running
board, he was in fact practically a captive of the
driver. This, of course, is compl~tely refuted by the
plaintiff's own testimony in which he said that
when the truck stopped at the stop sign, he had ample
time to get off the truck but did not do so, notwithstanding the fact that he knew it was a dangerous place on which to ride.
The fact that the defendant, Cloward, did not
go back to aid the boy he saw lying in the street
was clearly explained in his own testimony that
he did not know any boy was riding on his vehicle
after he left the stop sign and that he figured it
was some other boy playing a youthful prank upon
him. This was, of course, a question of fact for the
jury which the jury decided in the defendants'
favor.
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·The plaintiff's attorney also claims that there
was prejudicial error as indicative of the fact that
the jury found that $100.00 was all the damage to
which the plaintiff minor was entitled and yet his
special damages were $'82.50 which would only leave
$17.50 for pain and suffering. This is not true
and completely overlooks the fact that during the
trial the father was added as a party plaintiff, and
it was stipulated that if the plaintiff minor was entitled to recover anything, the court would award
judgment to the father in addition thereto in the
sum of $82.50. The jury's verdict of $100.00 for
the general damages under the evidence in this case
would not he classified as unreasonable and indica ting any prejudice. Furthermore in view of its findings on negligence and contributory negligence the
amount awarded was immaterial.
CONCLUSION
In this case the defendant did not inform or
intim'ate to the jury that he had no insurance on his
vehicle at the time of the accident, but merely that
he did not have any insurance on it at the time of
the trial. Such statement, therefore, was not prejudicial. In any event, the plaintiff by his failure
to examine the witness or take other 1action or move
for a mistrial waived any objection which he might
have to this statement.
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The court's instruction No. 14-A correctly stated
the law and was not covered by any other instructions. There was no prejudicial error in giving the
same to the jury. It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the case should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RICH & STRONG
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondents
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